If the Austrians were to be attacked by the Allied forces, the Germans would rush to their aid from the West with men and guns, and they could always send more help than we could. That was one argument.

The other was that if the Austrians were subjected to a combined attack, the Germans would take advantage of the temporary improvement in relative strength to break through our reduced garrison in France. Both could not be true. But to the military mind these arguments were not an alternative—they were cumulative. To quote a very pertinent comment from the British Official History of the Macedonian Campaign :—

> " There is a great difference in the attitude of a General Staff to arguments according as they fit in or conflict with its own desires."

3. SURPRISE

There was another consideration which in my opinion had not been sufficiently taken into account hitherto—a factor which even in the war of earth-works played a great part several times ; this was the element of surprise. It is safe to say that no striking success had hitherto been won except where the victor had managed to surprise the opposite army by an unexpected stroke or a stroke of unexpected strength. It was true up to the very end of the War. None of the battles of the Great War was decisive in the sense of ending the struggle immediately one

way or the other. *Some battles* But many of them were climacteric in their influence on the *important* progress of the campaign, and could be reckoned as turning points, temporary or permanent, in the course of the War. They effected